The Use of Counterfeit Code Signing Certificates Is on the Rise

Insikt Group

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Key Judgements

  • We observed the earliest use of stolen code certificates in 2011, but it was not until 2015 that code signing certificates became widely available in the criminal underground.
  • Insikt Group identified four well-known vendors of such products since 2011; only two vendors are currently soliciting their services to Russian-speaking hackers.
  • The most affordable version of a code signing certificate costs $299, but the most comprehensive Extended Validation (EV) certificate with a SmartScreen reputation rating is listed for $1,599. The starting price of a domain name registration with EV SSL certificate is $349.
  • All certificates are issued by reputable companies, such as Comodo, Thawte, and Symantec, and have proved to be extremely effective in malware obfuscation. We believe that legitimate business owners are unaware that their data was used in the illicit activities.
  • Network security appliances performing deep packet inspection become less effective when legitimate (legitimate certificate) SSL/TLS traffic is initiated by a malicious implant. Netflow (packet headers) analysis is an important control toward reducing risk, as host-based controls may also be rendered ineffective by legitimate code signing certificates.

Executive Summary

In 2017, security researchers around the world started seeing a sudden increase in code signing certificates being used as a layered obfuscation technique for malicious payload distribution campaigns. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group investigated the criminal underground and identified vendors currently offering both code signing certificates and domain name registration with accompanying SSL certificates.

Contrary to a common belief that the security certificates circulating in the criminal underground are stolen from legitimate owners prior to being used in nefarious campaigns, we confirmed with a high degree of certainty that the certificates are created for a specific buyer per request only and are registered using stolen corporate identities, making traditional network security appliances less effective.

Background

For a number of years, security researchers have warned the public about cybercriminals using counterfeited code signing certificates in their efforts to obfuscate malicious payloads, but only a handful of times were these underground services researched thoroughly.

As antivirus software detection capabilities improved, the standard tactics such as payload encryption were no longer sufficient. It became more challenging to sustain a file’s effectiveness for extended periods of time, sometimes requiring daily “cleaning” of executable files. As a result, cybercriminals needed a more comprehensive security approach and began experimenting with a secondary protection layer, signing payload files with the legitimately issued security certificates.

Although it was known that threat actors were using counterfeit certificates as early as 2011, it was not until 2015 that the first offerings surfaced in the underground.

Threat Analysis

One of the first vendors to offer counterfeit code signing certificates was known as C@T, a member of a prolific hacking messaging board. In March 2015, C@T offered for sale a Microsoft Authenticode capable of signing 32/64b versions of various executable files, as well as Microsoft Office, Microsoft VBA, Netscape Object Signing, and Marimba Channel Signing documents, and supported Silverlight 4 applications. Additionally, Apple code signing certificates were also available.

In his advertisement, C@T explained that the certificates are registered under legitimate corporations and issued by Comodo, Thawte, and Symantec — the largest and most respected issuers. The seller indicated that each certificate is unique and will only be assigned to a single buyer, which could be easily verified via HerdProtect.com. According to C@T, the success rate of payload installations from signed files increases by 30 to 50 percent, and he even admitted to selling over 60 certificates in less than six months.

During that time, C@T saw sales dwindle and failed to appeal to a broad client base because of prohibitive costs, in some cases demanding upwards of $1,000 per certificate, when other more affordable and reliable payload obfuscation methods were still available.

Timeline of Criminal Activity Involving Counterfeit Code Signing Certificates

The activity of criminal vendors of counterfeit code signing certificates in the dark web.

Approximately two years later, three new actors began offering their services primarily in the Eastern European underground. While one actor eventually moved on to other illicit operations, the remaining two actors still actively supply counterfeit certificates to Russian- speaking actors.

The second actor specializes in Class 3 certificates, which do not include Extended Validation (EV) assurance and are available for the price of $600, whereas the third actor offers the broadest range of products.

Standard code signing certificates issued by Comodo that do not include SmartScreen reputation rating cost $295. A buyer interested in the most trusted version of an EV certificate issued by Symantec would have to pay $1,599, a 230 percent premium compared to the price of the authentic certificate. For those seeking to purchase in bulk, fully authenticated domains with EV SSL encryption and code signing capabilities could also be arranged for $1,799.

Product List

Product listing advertised by a threat actor.

According to the information provided by both sellers during a private conversation, to guarantee the issuance and lifespan of the products, all certificates are registered using the information of real corporations. With a high degree of confidence, we believe that the legitimate business owners are unaware that their data was used in the illicit activities. It is important to note that all certificates are created for each buyer individually with the average delivery time of two to four days.

Technical Analysis

Both actors have acknowledged that due to the advanced security metrics employed in the Chrome browser — it is considered to be providing excellent security — clients must expect significantly lower levels of success penetrations compared to Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Safari browsers.

Insikt Group successfully convinced a vendor to conduct a trial, signing a provided payload executable of a previously unreported Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with a recently issued Comodo certificate. Despite that test-subject files were encrypted beforehand, the results of the test demonstrated the superior effectiveness of code signed versions.

While only eight antivirus providers successfully detected the encrypted version of the payload, only two of them were effective against the code signed version. More disturbing results surfaced after the same test was conducted for a non-resident version of the payload. In that case, only six companies were capable of detecting an encrypted version, and only Endgame protection successfully recognized the file as malicious.

Outlook

Network security appliances performing deep packet inspection become less effective when legitimate (legitimate certificate) SSL/TLS traffic is initiated by a malicious implant. Netflow (packet headers) analysis is an important control toward reducing risk, as host-based controls may also be rendered ineffective by legitimate code signing certificates.

Unlike ordinary crypting services readily available at $10-$30 per each encryption, we do not anticipate counterfeit certificates to become a mainstream staple of cybercrime due to its prohibitive cost. However, undoubtedly, more sophisticated actors and nation-state actors who are engaged in less widespread and more targeted attacks will continue using fake code signing and SSL certificates in their operations.

To view screenshots associated with this analysis, download the appendix.

The post The Use of Counterfeit Code Signing Certificates Is on the Rise appeared first on Recorded Future.

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Author: Andrei Barysevich